The run-up to a full-scale U.S. military attack on Iraq -"shock and awe" --provided an unusual and ideal test the effectiveness of a parsimonious content analysis methodology designed to determine when a national leader made or would make a decision to go to war. As W. Ben Hunt's work that is the model for this study anticipated, editorials in The Wall Street Journal clearly ramped up war fever with not only the number of "get to it, George " editorials but also with the language. Critical editorials advised/urged/demanded Bush to get on with the second phase of the long-planned remaking of the Middle East --taking out Saddam Hussein. The paper links several aspects of post-Cold War, postmodern American life --low levels of knowledge, use of poll data throughout society, declining news consumption and others --to paint a picture of a newly vulnerable society, one willing -polls would indicate -to listen to and follow clear, perhaps simplistic, policies even to the point of a pre-emptive strike on a small nation that many could not locate on a map.
Introduction
George Bush's presidency has been defined by military action, first in Afghanistan, then in the run-up to attacking Iraq. His presidency has also been distinguished by the scant number of live press conferences (two during prime time in two years); secrecy, misstatements and threats made by Bush and by cabinet members, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld remarks). New York press tagged journalists' docility at a March 2003, "a political catastrophe" and "a mini-Alamo for American journalism" (Gladstone, 2003) .
After the Sept. 11, 2001 , attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers in Washington and New York, unprecedented limitations placed on civil liberties met with little resistance from a fearful public. As Bush's verbal attacks on Iraq escalated through 2002 and into 2003 and military might massed on Iraqi borders, Bush became known around the world for strong-arming other nations' leaders, with a bucket of million dollar bills, for support despite worldwide popular resistance and for his unilateral abandonment of long-held treaties and allies. While Bush and the United States are despised by large majorities in most of the Arab world, including nations that are official allies of the United States (Moore, 2002 ), Bush's poll ratings with the American public inched upward even as American troops forged toward Iraq (Gallup, March 2003; see Figure 1 ). Even more nuanced polls such as the March 7, 2003, CBS poll, showed that a majority of Americans polled supported Bush (CBS, ). Bush has won Gallup's "most admired man" award, announced in December, for the second year in a row (Carroll, 2002) . At the same time Bush maintained poll ratings rivaling the most popular American presidents (Figure 1 ), he remained seemingly immune to economic and other domesMaterial published as part of these proceedings, either on-line or in print, is copyrighted by Informing Science. Permission to make digital or paper copy of part or all of these works for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage AND that copies 1) bear this notice in full and 2) give the full citation on the first page. It is permissible to abstract these works so long as credit is given. To copy in all other cases or to republish or to post on a server or to redistribute to lists requires specific permission from the publisher at Publisher@InformingScience.org tic problems and to political opposition. Many Democrats (21 in the Senate, 126 in the House), some explaining that the nation should be united on a war resolution, voted to authorize use of force against Iraq (Senate legislative events calendar, 2002) . However, as the United States increased bombings in the U.S.-U.K.-designated "no-fly zones" (Graham-Brown, 2001 ) in Iraq and brought troop strength in surrounding countries to more than 250,000, Democrats unified sufficiently in early 2003 to filibuster and block nomination of a nominee to the federal bench. But most Democrats' statements remained cautious on Iraq, even as millions of Americans joined anti-war protestors around the world. Criticism of Bush in the media has likewise been muted (Sperling, 2002; Kuttner, 2002) not only on Bush's war efforts but on curbs on domestic freedoms that violate some of the hallmarks of American life (ACLU, 2003) . Perhaps because they can't find what they are looking for in U.S. media, Americans have turned toward non-U.S. sources for news in increasing numbers since Sept. 11, 2001 (Campbell, 2001 . Choosing a non-U.S. news source could be triggered by a number of reasons, but one is certainly perceived shortcomings of all U.S. media, but partic ularly the most-popular news source, television news (FAIR, 2003 ). An Australian critic called American TV "j ingoistic, sugar-coated, superficial" and likewise faulted U.S. newspapers (Sydney Herald; Campbell) .
Purpose of This Research
The main goal of the paper is to determine whether editorials in the nation's second-highest circulation newspaper, the business-oriented Wall Street Journal, anticipate the commencement of war in Iraq, as W. Ben Hunt's pioneering (if little acclaimed) work, Getting to War: Predicting International Conflict with Mass Media Indicator, found in the 1991 attack on Iraq (Hunt, 1997 ). Hunt applied his method (described later in this paper) to the Desert Storm campaign as well as other conflicts throughout the 20 th century. Following Hunt's caveat, this work isn't suggesting that reading a nation's elite newspapers is all one has to do to know which way the political conflict wind blows but rather to bring about "greater appreciation of the regular and predictable aspects of the interna l behaviors of the parts (of the system) toward building a general theory. Nor does this research suggest that editorials in a newspaper might cause a war; the expectation is that elite newspapers telegraph the plans of political elites. This paper (Jones, 2003; Copyright 2003, the Gallup Organization, all rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.) links several facets of American life to the runup to war in Iraq --the news media, the Bush presidential style and team and the low level of knowledge of Americans. Poll data ranking President Bush as among the top-ranked presidents in history are plotted against the position he and the United States hold in the rest of the world. The expectation is that the state of intellectual life in the United States, the nature of the media and the composition and behavior of the presidential team all contribute to the likelihood that Journal editorials, both by quantity and by tone, will anticipate "getting to war."
This paper reviews the interactions of media and public opinion, and foreign policy, linking poll data and newspaper circulation figures to the well-known (and embarrassing) phenomenon of Americans' low level of knowledge of public affairs, geography, and history. With that backdrop, it uses content analysis of editorials in The Wall Street Journal to determine their relatio nship with world events. In the case of Iraq, which the United States bombed almost continuously from 1991 forward, the lack of a clear-cut starting point to 'war" or "conflict" could present special problems.
Background
Media scholars have for decades attempted to understand the three-way relationship involved in public opinion, material disseminated in the mass media and governmental policies and actions. In one major group of studies, several scholars examined government systems, press freedom and newspapers, the major medium of the first half of the 20 th century (Siebert, 1956 ). Siebert's study published in 1952 on the development of press freedom in England rested on the observation that leaders' willingness to permit freedom of the press was directly related to pressures the nation experienced externally and internally (including public reaction). In the 1950s, in the first ma mmoth computer-assisted content analysis, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner analyzed elite newspapers around the world. In two books, the team empirically linked what was published in prestige newspapers to social changes and to political elites (de Sola Pool, 1951 , 1952 .
The de Sola Pool 1951 wo rk noted: "(Elite newspaper opinion) is always in some way tied to the go vernment, the degree of intimacy being a function of the politicization of the particular elite," and the newspapers provided an opportunity to detect "semiofficial expressions of elite opinion. " The authors noted, citing Speier, that public opinion became an influence on foreign policy in the 20 th century (1970) . Prestige newspapers, they said, represent the government point of view, especially on foreign policy (p. 222). In another major body of work, the title of Deutsch's 1963 study of the mediagovernment relationship -The Nerves of Government -telegraphed his assessment of the role played by a nation's communication system. Deutsch emphasized the necessity that national leaders in democracies build public support to spend the political and financial capital for armed conflict.
…Democracies will find it necessary, and even dictatorships find it expedient, to reduce or dispel this apathy by confronting their populations with the image of a single, sharply defined enemy and a single, clear-cut conflict…It should be possible to say whether the amount of attention given to a specific conflict area or to the image of a particular 'enemy' country is reaching the danger point….it should be possible to construct an "early warning system," in regard to the mass-communication aspects of interstate conflicts. (Deutsch, 1957 , cited in Hunt, 1997 Hunt complemented the Deutsch's ideas with game theory and ma thematical proofs, but after testing his theories and methods with long-term content analysis of newspapers from around the world, he determined that the simple and elegant method of looking at editorials, which he found to be more revealing of an administration's plans than diplomatic communication, predicted the onset of war in almost all cases across time.
The man in the street and the men in the White House
Whether the "man in the street" influences foreign policy and whether such influence is desirable ha s been the focus of numerous studies, many of them related to polling. Anyone reading or viewing modern mass media can attest to the ir ubiquity. Polling has been used to test public reaction to women's wearing bathing suits in beauty contests (Holsti, 1996) but answering pollsters questions, even if you don't know anything about the topic, has become one way to participate in political life. Voters knew so little about candidates in a school election in California that they relied on party labels (Schaffner and Streb, 2002) . Indeed, in one poll in the runup to the U.S. attack on Iraq, Americans were asked whether the U.S. Congress should declare war. Sixty-two percent said yes; a follow-up asked against whom war should be declared. Sixty-one percent didn't know, but two percent added, "No one; just declare war" (Robertson, 2003) . Robertson wrote that pollsters ask Americans questions that they couldn't answer: Is Osama bin Laden alive or dead? Would you kill him, given the opportunity? How long will the war last? (This was for the Afghanistan war.) Making data of dubious value meaningful is a challenge for journalists who find meaning in polls that have no meaning because of the margin of error. Robertson (2003) quoted CNN's Garrick Utley's handling of the poll in which people wanted to go to war but didn't know the name of an enemy: "That uncertainty gives President bush flexibility and time to determine what kind of a war he intends to wage."
American's lack of knowledge extends across topics and even includes illusions about what they do know. People who couldn't define "molecule" or display knowledge of other basic science facts told pollsters that they understood science (National Science Board, 2003) . Seniors at Ivy League colleges can't distinguish between statements by Karl Marx and the Founding Fathers of the United States ("Students Flunk U.S. History Test"). Nearly 60 percent of City University of New York -and many other schools had similar figures --students would be denied citizens hip because they could not correctly answer at least 7 of 10 basic American history questions as required of immigrants seeking U.S. citize nship (Center for Excellence, 2000) . More Americans correctly located the Marquesas Islands as the site of a Survivor series than could find New Jersey, and young people old enough to be sent to war in Iraq can't fid it on a map (Global Goofs, 2002) .. The Columbia Law survey results demonstrated that "little more than half of college seniors know general information about American democracy and the Constitution," and most "do not know specifics about major wars the United States participated in" (Passantio, 2002) . Nearly one-third of Americans (29 percent) think the Constitution guarantees a job (National council on Economic Education).. Forty-two percent think it guarantees health care. The pile-up could continue ad infinitum, but the pint is made: On almost any topic, Americans of all ages know little although they think they are knowledgeable. On many tests, American score at the bottom of third-world countries; for example, on the annual National Geographic exam (Global Goofs, 2002) , Americans scored higher than only one nation, Mexico. "If our young people can't find places on a map and lack awareness of current events, how can they understand the world's cultural, economic and natural resource issues that confront us?" asked John Fahey, president of the National Geographic Society (Fahey, 2002) .
Americans attention to newspapers and television has dropped dramatically in the last few decades lik ewise have abandoned TV news programs as show-business values replaced jour nalistic values and TV executives stifled investigative reporting. As Murdoch-owned Fox news challenged the traditional three networks for dominance and the blur between news and entertainment, a respected news reporter Peter Boyer expressed his thoughts in Who Killed CBS-The Undoing of America's Number One News Network (1988) . The network news audience plummeted from 60 percent of Americans in the mid 1990s to 30 percent in 2002, with only 20 percent of college graduates younger than 50 watching TV news (Patterson, 2002) . College students' media usage has shifted to the unedited internet (Figure 2) , with newspaper use among students in Whitaker's sample dropping below all other media. Similar disenchantment with "news-lite" in the United Kingdom led to almost a 50 percent drop in the audience of Tonight with Trevor McDo nald and to a columnist's dubbing TV "an idiot's lantern" (Cox, 2002) .
Newspaper readership declined from an average of 51 percent of Americans 18 years and older in 1997 to 46 percent in 2000, with declines in all age group. Weekday newspaper dropped from 76 percent to 68 percent, and TV news viewing dropped from 88 percent to 80 percent in the same three-year time span. The American audience's limited taste for news -and the gap between journalists and "ordinary Americans --is demonstrated by a newspaper columnist's experience on the eve of Bush's March 17 press conference in which he delivered the first-time declaration-of-war ultimatum on TV. The caller to the Akron Beacon-Journal wanted to know the age and marital status of the man on Wheel of Fortune (Heldenfels, 2003) .
Pollsters have long known that Americans' knowledge levels are low, but they want the data anyway. Holsti (1996) noted that poorly informed Americans provides increasing opportunities for public participation in foreign policy, but other scholars question their merit. Authors of three important postWorld War II studies of public opinion and foreign policy examined the major polls of the war years and reacted with "a distinctly skeptical view of the man in the street" and his contributions to foreign policy conduct (Holsti, 19, citing Bailey (1948) , Markel (1949) , and Almond (1950) . The authors feared that ill-informed, emotional Americans would drive foreign policy in a direction they considered undesirable (toward isolationism). During the same period, however, some administrations made good use of public opinion to gain approval of the Marshall Plan, NATO and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Holsti, (211) (212) . Post-Vietnam research also challenged previously held views that public opinion was volatile, structureless, and without significant impact on policymaking (Holsti, 20) . Despite that realization, politicians largely ignore citizens' viewpoint on public issues such as Social Security, resorting instead to vague claims in the people's names (Cook, Barabas, and Page, 2002 ) that were sometimes misleading or inaccurate. Claims in Congressional testimony that the public viewed Social Security as "bankrupt" and that privatization is the solution, for example, were not complemented with contrary findings in poll archives. The authors called such misuse "disturbing" and warned of its negative impact on "democratic responsiveness."
Another recurring theme in discussions of media, public opinion, on the one hand, and political leaders and foreign policy, including war, on the other, questions whether inaccurate or misleading "news" and (Whitaker, 2003) disinformation render public opinion meaningless. Lippmann (1920) complained that "the manufacture of consent" by an "unregulated private enterprise" -the press -amounted to a crisis of western civilization, a crisis of journalism. He and Charles Merz, a colleague at The New Republic, found that The New York Times' coverage of he Russian Revolution was "inadequate and misleading." They said news about Russia came about by men seeing what they wanted to see, with the effect of "almost always misleading" (Lippmann and Merz 1920, 42) .
Another concern that has taken front court in the post-modern era concerns official government misinformation (also called disinformation). However, official disinformation --lying --is nothing new in public life. Though the specifics differ, a host of modern examples suggest that disinformation is or has become standard procedure. At the end of the 19 th century, the alleged attack on the battleship Maine became an infamous media event as well as the pretext for President McKinley's intervening in the Cuban war for independence from Spain (Spanish-American War). FDR's "optimistic public expressions" on Russia helped hold together the Allied World War II. Lyndon Johnson's account of an attack on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin led to Congressional approval for widening the war against Vietnam (Holsti, 1996) . President George H.W. Bush's relationship to the Iran-contra scandal escaped the scrutiny of the U.S. prosecutor investigating Iran-Contra becaus e the prosecutor focused on criminal prosecution. "The main charges against Bush are not of criminal misconduct, but of distorting the trutha political sin, perhaps, but not a criminal offense" (McManus, 1992) . With Nixon's Watergate shenanigans and Clinton's zipper problems, the list includes all presidents in the last half of the 20 th century except Nobel Prize winner Jimmy Carter. Indeed, disinformation seems to be the rule rather than the exception.
Bush administration secrecy and manipulation
George W. Bush's approach to foreign relations can be seen as the behavior of a self-confident but folksy Yale fraternity president (Delta Kappa Epsilon) , a baseball team owner and a Texan given to malapropos (Among the many Bushsites, If he makes it, we're doomed). At about the same time Bill Clinton found a National Guard slot through the help of a political friend, Bush signed up for the Guard, going ahead of about 500 on the list, but left no official paper trail of completing his three-year assignment (Robinson, 2000) . He is viewed by some critics as a front man for plans and ideas crafted decades ago by hawkish members of his cabinet who also served his father (Lewis, 2002) . While proclaiming openness, the president practices secrecy. Presidential press secretary Ari Fleischer declared: "The bottom line remains the president is dedicated to an open government, a responsive government, while he fully exercises the authority of the executive branch." But an expert on government secrecy, Alan Brinkley, a Columbia University historian, said the Bush administration has "taken (secrecy) to a new level." The Bush administration's instinct is to release nothing, Brinkley said, adding "They are just worried about what's in there that they don't know about" (Clymer, 2003) . Among the successes was Vice President Dick Cheney's ability to keep records of his energy task force secret. Even before Sept. 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered government officials to reject requests when legally possible under the Freedom of Information Act. Classification of documents as secret edged up 18 percent in Bush's first year. Some 68,000 Reagan-era records were closed Nov. 1, 2001 (Taiara, 2003) . In the legal area, the secrecy was even more intense. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, immigration officials have exercises a rare degree of secrecy about individuals who are arrested and detained. Immigration hearings for hundreds of people caught in sweeps after the bombings have been closed to relatives, the news media and the public. Names and details of people INS detained were kept secret; in December, the Associated Press was able to get the number of people arrested and released from the Justice Department. Bush the president has behaved in the same secret manner as Bush the governor (Clymer, 2003) .
Bush administration secrecy has sparked little public debate but has generated bipartisan congressional complaints. Democrat Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, first elected in 1974, said, "Since I've been here, I have never known an administration that is more difficult to get information from." Republican Sen. Charles E. Grassley, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, said things were getting worse, and "it seems like in the last month or two, I've been running into more and more stonewalls." Lega l scholars have objected to immigration and courtroom restrictions.
In March 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee docket called for a hearing on "post-War Iraq." The White House sent no one to testify. Senator Chuck Hagel, the Republican from Nebraska who chairs the committee, reacted: "We all pushed to give us some sense of this. No answers. The administration chose not to have witnesses today. No answers. I think the president was asked in his news conference the other night. No answers. And I think the best that they have come up with is, `Well, you'll know about it when we bring up the supplemental appropriation.' I don't think that's a good way to do this" (Norris, 2003) . The senators had read in The Wall Street Journal, they said, that the Agency for International Development was taking bids on rebuilding Iraq from a handful of companies, including Halliburton, the firm Cheney's headed before he became vice president and from which his 2001 financial disclosure statement said he draws up to $1 million a year (Bryce, 2003) .
Sen. Christopher Dodd, ranking Democrat on the committee, reacted angrily to the White House failure to testify: "I find that terribly disturbing. There's an arrogance to that. That is, we've seen evidence in allied reaction to the effort in Iraq, and it's now showing up here, and I don't think that's going to be very helpful. That's going to make the job of winning my support for those kind(s) of efforts a lot more difficult in the coming months." (Norris) The House has even greater difficulties, given the two-year election cycle.
(The Bush administration's) attitude toward Congress is contemptuous; it tells legislators only what it is forced to, and takes Congress into consideration only when there is no other choice. Other administrations have played loose with the truth, especially when it came to obtaining the power to wage war, but the Bush administration does a striking amount of it. And it's an administration that plays rough. (Drew, 2002) At the same time, journalists are manipulated openly. Bob Woodward of Watergate fame -and perhaps infamy for his latest effort, Bush at War, has a key to the White House (Confessore, 2002) . Woodward's colleague at the Washington Post, Dana Milbank, suffers insults, calls to his editors and other marks of being an outsider or, perhaps, a journalist. The few press conferences Bush sets (his second live press conference occurred as his "shock and awe" phase of the Iraqi attack was about to start in March 2003) are scripted, with favored journalists or plants tossing softballs to the president. Burmese journalist exiled in Thailand gave American journalists a tongue-lashing: "America's journalists have failed in their duty to ask questions about the consequences of war in Iraq and to report on its growing worldwide opposition," wrote Aung Zaw (2003) . "…America's mainstream media has been far from encouraging, as many journalists seem dangerously ignorant of their public duty. Since Washington started selling the idea of war on Iraq, mainstream media outlets in the US have been filled with 'objective' reporting-inflated by the ongoing rhetoric from officials." Reporters without Borders pleaded unsuccessfully for the release of Sami Al-Haj, a Sudanese cameraman for the Qatar television station Al-Jazeera who was swept up with some 600 other people in Afghanistan and held at The U.S. military compound in Cuba, Guantanamo (Al-Jazeera, 2002).
Bush's team
Bush's actions are best understood within the framework of the team he assembled as advisers and cabinet members. Curiously, the major hawks were trained by a Democrat, the late Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington state. Though he died in 1983, Jackson, more than any other person, may be responsible for the Bush administration's bellicose showdown with Iraq and its muscular new doctrine of pre-emption. "Today's grey eminences behind the 'war on terror' were once young apprentices under (Dorothy Fosdick's) supervision" (Borger) . Fosdick was Jackson's foreign policy adviser for 28 years.
Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith, the two leading strategists in the Bush-Cheney defense department, and Richard Perle, an influential Pentagon adviser though not an elected or appointed official, are fo rmer Democrats who worked for Jackson in the 1970s; all three considered Jackson as their me ntor. Perle claims to be a registered Democrat, and Wolfowitz has described himself as a "Scoop Jackson Republican" (Borger, 2002) . Another Jackson protégée, Elliott Abrams, is in charge of White House policy in the Middle East. Abrams, who was convicted of misleading Congress about the Iran-contra affair, remains committed to Jackson's argument favoring use of American power with principled support of human rights. Another Jackson protégée, Frank Gaffney, runs the Center for Security Policy, a rightwing think tank that has served as an incubator for the emerging themes of Bush foreign policy since Sept. 11: the assertive use of military power, an aggressive pre-emptive approach to emerging threats, and uncompromising support for the Likud party and its policies in Israel (Borger, 2002) .
The names, like many of the policies, can be traced back to the Reagan White House. Several have argued for years that Hussein should be removed from power. They have sought to push the younger Bush farther into the plan they devised for the Reagan administration than the first Bush would accept. Their influence is apparent in the September 2002 Bush document, "National Security Strategy of the United States." It is similar to one published in 2000, "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century," a document in the works since 1997. Several member of the Bush cabinet, listed in the report, helped create the document (Rebuilding, 2000) (http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf). Numerous writers have made connections between several Bush cabinet and sub-cabinet members and Likud, the Zionist party devoted to establishing Israeli dominance in the Middle East (Vest, 2001; Alterman, 2003;  ), Bush's modus operandi can be seen in a close look at the secrecy issue.
Just as many of the younger Bush's cabinet were recycled from the first President Bush's staff, their policies differ only slightly in relation to war. The elder Bush moved away from the Cold War's emphasis on containment rather than war became more comfortable with the idea of go verning through the use of force (Knight). Knight wrote: "President Bush the Younger's new strategy takes us further down the road toward normalizing war as an instrument of choice for achieving valued ends. For an official document of the U.S. government (in accordance with the Goldwater -Nichols Defense Department Reorga nization Act of 1986), the Bush National Security Strategy of 2002 is disturbingly insubstantial, ideological, and, at times, disingenuous. All together, it betrays a remarkably casual attitude toward matters of grave concern to Americans and many people around the globe." The Strategy document reiterates the strategic goal that Wolfowitz and Cheney artic ulated in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States" (p. 30 in Strategy document).
The administration, according to Knight-Ridder reporters Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay, and John Walcott, put "very strong pressure" on Pentagon analysts "to cook the intelligence books" and come up with information to corroborate the Bush administration's charges that Iraq poses a grave and imminent threat to the United States (Strobel). Unnamed federal officials charged that the administration squelched dissenting views and that intelligence analysts were under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the White House's arguments demonizing Saddam Hussein.
Propaganda and "Disinformation"
Observers around the globe have witnessed the Bush administration's ever-changing, yet constant, rhetorical runup to war. Canadian speechwriter David Frum is credited with originating the phrase that ge nerated perhaps the most controversy of any of Bush's speeches -the infamous "axis of evil" moniker applied to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Before Frum resigned to publish the first insider account of the Bush White House, he contributed the phrase "axis of hatred" to Bush's first State of the Union address. The phrase became the "axis of evil" in Bush's 2002 State of the Union address and became identified with Bush's rhetorical excesses and well as with his rejuvenated public image after Sept. 11 (Frum, 2003 ). Frum's story of how the phrase morphed from "axis of hatred" makes clear how important language is to the Bush administration. Frum applied his phrase only to Iraq, but National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice argued that Iran should be included; then the administration decided it didn't want to appear to be targeting only Muslim nations, so North Korea was added. "Hatred" became "evil" to keep the theological tone that Bush had adopted since Sept. 11. Frum and conservative Brent Bozell (Bozell) likened the controversy over the phrase to media reaction to Reagan's naming the Soviet Union the "evil empire." Bozell complained about the media's "evil-dismissing trend," and wrote that his Media Research Center analysts found only 5 references (14 percent) to the evil nations in all 37 evening news stories on ABC, CBS and NBC discussing the "axis of evil" from the day after the State of the Union speech through Feb. 19. The administration's willingness to present dubious evidence in its attempt to prove that Saddam Hussein violated U.N. resolutions brought rebuke at the United Nations and in the Congress. In March 2003, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee demanded investigation of documents submitted as proof that Iraq had continued its weapons program. Mohammed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told the U.N. Security Council tha t the documents were forgeries ("Top Democrats…"). In another fracas, National Public Radio reported that Republican Foreign Relations Committee Chair Sen. Richard Lugar was "startled" to learn from the Wall Street Journal that the administration had asked selected companies, including Halliburton, to bid on rebuilding post-war Iraq. Yet the administration declined to send anyone from the White House to testify at the committee's hearings on post-war Iraq. Democrat committee member Sen. Christopher Dodd reacted: "There's an arrogance to (White House behavior). That is, we've seen evidence in allied reaction to the effort in Iraq, and it's now showing up here, and I don't think that's going to be very helpful" (Profile: Senators are Upset ). The administration got caught again when Powell presented a photograph in his highly touted U.N. speech giving support for the U.S. position; the photo alleged to be a terrorist and explosives training center turned out to be a small Kurdish village (Daraghi).
British columnist John Pilger accused the United States and the United Kingdom of using scare tactics in warnings of anthrax and germ warfare attacks as well planting stories linking Iraq with terrorists. "The absurdity of all this is becoming grotesque, and the British public needs to ask urgent questions of its Government," Pilger wrote (Pilger, 2002) . He complained of "black propagandists" who repeated disproven accusations "to justify an unprovoked attack on Iraq by linking the regime in Baghdad with alQaeda terrorism…."
A small group of retired CIA officers appealed to colleagues still inside to go public with the Bush administration's skewed claims on Iraq to support its case for war with Iraq. "It's been cooked to a recipe, and the recipe is high policy, " complained Ray McGovern, a 27-year CIA veteran who briefed top Reagan administration security officials before retiring in 1990 (Lumpkin) .
Former United States Information Agency cultural official Nancy Snow called the Bush administration's propaganda war "the most integrated part of the New War," a game featuring "surround-sound of la nguage and image control." Today propaganda infiltration of the media system is more intense than ever, with religious-overtone words like "crusade" brought into political talk. Once the administration declared a "war" on terrorism, she noted, debate was done (Snow). The administration earmarked $520 million to focus on "disaffected populations" in the Middle East and South Asia and the establishment of a 24-hour Arabic language satellite news network called Radio Sawa. New York PR woman Charlotte Beers, who made her name by promoting Uncle Ben's Rice, designed a massive State Department pub-lic relations program and vowed to reach a "30 percent conversion rate" among Muslims, but after several months and numerous problems, Beers resigned (Snow).
Knightley, author of a book on war reporting, complained that reporting on wars in western media fo llows 'a depressingly predictable pattern': stage one, the crisis; stage two, the demonization of the enemy's leader; stage three, the demonization of the enemy as individuals; and stage four, atrocities. Though he focused on the U.S. attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan, his assessment also fits the runup to the attack on Iraq. While politicians talk diplomacy and plan war, he wrote, media tell the public: "We're on the brink of war," or "War is inevitable" (Knightley), until the plaint becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Complaints about Media Coverage
Complaints about U.S. media coverage range from failure to cover stories to publishing administration propaganda without regard to its truthfulness. Even when a major news organization investigates and publishes important news, other outlets virtually ignore it. During the Bush-Gore presidential campaign, The Boston Globe investigated how Bush avoided going to war -an issue that hounded Bill Clinton throughout his presidency -and discovered that Bush had failed to fulfill obligations to the National Guard, a prized spot he got in 1968, leapfrogging over 500 other men on the list (Robinson, Walter V.) But a search of electronic databases turned up no other newspaper that ran the information. Even before the Bush team made public its plan to remake the Middle East, U.S. media had given Bush a pass on important stories. In summer of 2001, scandal-hungry mainstream media chased any scrap of a story on the missing former aide to Rep.Gary Condit while ignoring Bush's appointment of several Iran-Contra veterans to key posts. "But with a few admirable exceptions, news stories about Elliot Abrams, John Negroponte and Otto Reich have largely relied on past reporting and he-said, she-said soundbites by the usual supporters and critics, rather than in-depth investigations into their complicity in one of the bloodiest scandals of the past 20 years," Terry J. Allen wrote for FAIR. "And their guilt is based not on speculation or gossip, but on hard evidence that they aided torturers and death squads, circumvented Congress and the Constitution, and deceived the American people." The same three Reagan-era officials surfaced again for their role in a coup that ousted Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez briefly and set off a year of instability; the London newspaper, The Observer, published the story (Vulliamy).
The Bush administration set out early in his first year to squelch criticism. The National Writers Union sent a letter listing 10 specific anti-press actions by the administration in September and October, 2001 ("Call for Press Freedom during Times of War"). The list included press secretary Ari Fleischer's Sept. 26, 2001, caution to journalists and to the public that they need to "watch what they say," Rice's conference call with five television network executives in which they agreed not to air video from Osama bin Laden or terrorists and Fleischer's statement that he would probably make a similar request to newspapers. Journalists noted soon after Fleischer's warning to watch what they said that the press secretary's tirade had been scrubbed from the text posted on the White House website and wasn't reposted for several days (Rich). By Sept. 28, 2001, WorkingforChange reported that the White House wasn't "pla ying nice anymore." Communications staffers warned reporters not only to watch what they say but openly played favorites in setting up interviews and acknowledged it would lie to the public. "The White House has developed a particularly tense, mutually distrustful relationship with members of the news media" (WorkingforChange.com).
The New York Times and major television networks ignored a story broken by the London-based Observer about U.S. spying on U.N. Security Council diplomats. Media-watchdog FAIR also noted that major U.S. media had swallowed administration allegations as if they were fact despite mounting evidence that many claims were bogus (FAIR, "New York Times and Networks"; "A Failure of Skepticism"). Various anti-war groups with websites picked up stories from abroad that American media did not print to disseminate to their readers (See, for instance, Take Back the Media, Who Dies and Truthout).
Dissent has triggered angry response from Bush officials and their supporters. The Screen Actors' Guild, fearing McCarthy-era witch hunts, condemned what it called blacklisting in the wake of Sean Penn's difficulties with publisher Rupert Murdoch after Penn's trip to Iraq and Martin Sheen's warnings about his anti-war protests ("Actors Guild"). Anti-war groups have complained that mainstream media ignored them or misrepresented the number of protestors. "Why Did Mainstream News Media Downplay the 100,000+ Antiwar Protestors in D.C. In October? " asked Buzzflash News Analysis. The New York Times, Washington Post and NPR --which conservatives consistently point to as bastions of the liberal press --severely underplayed the event or else limited the coverage to inside sections of the newspaper. NPR put the number at "fewer than 10,000," The New York Times reported "thousands" but "fewer people attended than organizers had said they hoped for" (Buzzflash). A public outcry generated a second-day story in The New York Times that conceded the strength of the growing antiwar movement and issued new, more accurate attendance numbers for the march -without calling the story a correction (FAIR).
Todd Gitlin, who studied media inattention to social protestors in the '60s and is now a profe ssor, noted that the reasons war dissenters gave for their disagreement got scant attention from the news media. "At the TV networks, there is not even embarrassment about this short-shrifting of dissent and argument in a sound-bite culture" (Gitlin).
Research Methodology
The venerable Karl W. Deutsch, like many early communication scholars, spent many years parsing out the links between mass media and public life and government. Newspapers could be "an early warning system" since media attention to a conflict area or an enemy country could "harden public opinion to such a degree as eventually to destroy the freedom of choice of the national go vernment concerned" (Deutsch, 1957, p. 202) . By measur ing the attention allotted to specific interstate conflicts and issues and determining leaders' memory of the news, Deutsch hoped to determine the media messages' cumulative effects.
Hunt developed a straight-forward content analysis methodology based on Deutsch's ideas that showed great power in predicting when presidential administrations made the decision to go to war (1997). Hunt determined that newspaper editorials in elite newspapers telegraphed leaders' plans, not through direct intervention in democratic societies but through the interaction of media and political elites and their similar interests and backgrounds. In the United States, editorials in The New York Times predicted war decisions in a Democratic Party administration, and The Wall Street Journal served the same purpose when a Republican was president. Hunt found that as few as two editorials could indicate when the decision to begin hostilities had been made.
The research question is :
"Do editorials in The Wall Street Journal predict when President Bush would make or made the decision to commence the second phase of his war on terrorism, the "shock and awe" attack on Iraq?"
Operationalizing the action aspect of the question is the most difficult aspect. When did the United States 'go to war" against Iraq? Several bombing raids during the Clinton administration were followed by regular attacks during the Bush presidency. Therefore, the logical choice would be the "shock and awe" phase that began as troops and machinery of war massed on the Iraqi borders by early March, 2003.
The content analysis included all editorials in the Wall Street Journal from Sept. 12, 2001 , through March 12, 2003 . All editorials in Lexis-Nexis for the specified months were included in the study as well as editorials published on the newspaper's OpinionJournal online that did not appear in the LexisNexis listing. Identifying editorials was not an issue since both Lexis-Nexis and the online Journal ind icated which items were editorials. ProQuest was used to obtain the editorials by searching on the words "Bush," Hussein" and "Iraq." Hunt found the methodology to be sufficiently robust even when limited to content analysis over short times; for his study of the 1991 U.S.-Iraq war, Hunt analyzed editorials published from Aug. 2, 1990, through Jan., 15, 1991.
Hunt stipulated two main conditions in assessing decision-making to go to war. (1) Efforts to build pubic opinion should precede all wars and (2) the level of opinion-building effort should be commensurate with the level of subsequent interstate conflict (p. 155). He divided editorials into analytical -the "normal" piece that focuses on the actions of the potential adversary rather than the actions of the home nation, written in a conciliatory, cautious tone. An analytical editorial does not propose a violent solution to a problem with another nation. The second type, critical, has a higher level of vitriol, namecalling and harsh words. Critical editorials fo cus on justifying a unilateral action or threatening some escalation. (Full coding instructions are included in Hunt, .
Using the Wages of War data set (Singer and Small), Hunt studied pairs of nations, pitting each nation against all others and dividing them into war and no-war groups. Editorials were coded into analytical and critical for each month, logit regression applied, with editorial count as the only independent variable, and a graph created with likelihood of war on the vertical axis and the number of editorials on the base. "Such an analysis provides striking support for hypothesis H1, that wars are preceded by an effort to build pubic support…(T)his chart suggests that wars may be indicated by only two or more critical editorials, rather than the three or more suggested by data set 1 (in which Hunt counted but did not code editorials). In only 2 cases of the 139 cases was war not preceded by two or more critical editorialsIraq-Kuwait and Iran-Uganda. The failures occurred, Hunt wrote, because he had been unable to get the "elite" national newspaper from Iraq and from Uganda (66). In his no-war sample, Hunt found no nation in which two or more critical editorials were written of a potential target nation. Editorials predic ting war become clearer as war approaches, Hunt suggested, with the most reliable indications in the month before the onset of war.
Hunt's methodology is well suited to this project because of several unusual aspects of the conflict. President George W. Bush's father, George H. W. Bush, masterminded the 1991-2 Desert Storm war and was the victim of an assassination attempt allegedly by two Iraqis. Some critics cite vengeance as one of the younger Bush's motives for vowing to bring about a "regime change" in Iraq, while others cast his rationale in an economic mode since Iraq has the second-largest oil reserves in the world, second only to Saudi Arabia. The messy evidence presented to justify the war, including several pieces of suspect data, quarreling with longtime allies France and Germany, and offering huge loans or gifts to gain allies, clouds the picture further. Some 250,000-300,000 troops from the U.S., the U.K. and Australia and materiel await the start of war in states surrounding Iraq -a country of about 20 million people --as Bush threatened to attack. U.N. inspectors supervised destruction of much of Iraq's store of weapons after the 1991 war, and Iraq was ordered by the U.N. to complete the destruction and not rebuild. Also, frequent bombings of the unauthorized "no-fly zones" --as many as six flights a day during the first months of 2003 -by the United States and United Kingdom served as a "softening up" process that attempted to destroy Iraq's communication systems. As Bush threatened to start his "shock and awe" delivery of thousands of missiles and other munitions in one massive blast to begin the war, Iraq could be likened to a bull in a ring, weakened to the point of exhaustion by the picador, allowing the matador to attack the almost-lifeless bull without fear, possibly a plan to induce Hussein to go into exile rather than face the attackers.
Results
Even casual reading of The Wall Street Journal makes clear that the newspaper has been a staunch supporter of Bush and the hawks in his cabinet since his campaign began. After he was placed in the presidency, editorial writers talked to him (in print) as if he were their son, someone they felt like counseling, even chastising, but only in supportive terms. Figure 3 , with a more prolonged spike in February into .
From that point, the drumbeat continued to grow louder, with nine editorials in October, of which seven were critical. Another lull anticipated the storm of eight editorials in February 2003, of which three that dealt with auxiliary topics -Eastern European nations' support of going to war, for example -were rated analytical.
As is readily seen, the drumbeat for war ebbed and flowed from Sept. 11, 2001 , forward, escalating rapidly from August 2002 forward. Immediately after the Sept. terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the Journal began calling for war against Saddam Hussein. In an editorial Sept. 19, 2001 , noted that Bush had nearly universal public support before he started any military action. The next day, the paper warned that "war won't end in Kabul," but targets were limited to "terrorist camps in Syria, Sudan, Libya and Algeria, and perhaps even in parts of Egypt." Then the writer took up the language and tone that the Journal would make ever shriller: "The granddaddy of these countries is Iraq, and -no surprise -reports are swirling that Saddam Hussein was also behind last week's attacks." The editorial said that Israeli military intelligence believed Iraq had helped finance the assault and that Mohamed Atta, team leader of the World Trade Center and Pentagon assaults, "also reportedly met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Europe a few months ago."
The words and phrases heard in Bus h's speeches -crusade, "just" and "moral" war, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" -resounded in Journal editorials.
After reading a few of the Journal's editorials, readers become accustomed to certain pairings: "feckless" always went with "Clinton" and Saddam Hussein was never far from "regime change" or "depose" or "thug." The newspaper's name calling extended to Germany and its leaders, France and its leaders and Hans Blix, with less critical words for Kofi Annan. Readers don't have to read the editorials: the paper sums up its main theme in the headline, then follows with an abstract that doesn't mince words. An Oct. 22, 2002, editorial was headlined "Sadam Ceausescu? Maybe regime change won't require war." An anti-Blix editorial Nov. 23, 2002, proclaimed "Hans Blix's Third Try: Will the chief U.N. inspector agree to another Iraq whitewash?" If Hunt's thesis successfully predicts when Bush will get to war, the increase in belligerent editorials that began in February would warn "the enemy" to run for the hills. Hunt found that two critical editorials were sufficient to predict "getting to war" and if the number of critical editorials (in this case, 5 in February and 5 in the first 12 days of March) predicts the magnitude of the war, Iraqis seem doomed to suffer the "shock and awe" that Bush has promised. Hunt's more sophisticated mathematical testing of the relationship between the variables would undoubtedly yield more elegant results, but in his work, as here, the simple numbers seem sufficient to predict a nation's actions.
Discussion
It seems clear that President George W. Bush will order the forces on the borders of Iraq to move into the country. With polls in the United States supporting such a move by large percentages and investigative journalism on holiday, he risks little political capital. However, public opinion that is not informed tends to volatility, and majority support can turn into majority opposition quickly. In addition, one of the lessons of the Vietnam is that public opinion responds to bodies of military personnel coming home in caskets as well as to television pictures of innocent victims' suffering. Perhaps shocking pictures will trigger political interest in more Americans, particularly if the economy remains slow. Those who opposed Bush's presidency -a plurality of those who voted, leading to Bush's becoming the first president in American history chosen by the U.S. Supreme Court -could represent a core of continuing protest.
The content analysis as a barometer of war fever produced astonishing results, partly because Wall Street Journal editorial writers don't hold back; they let the venom -and name-calling -flow. The message is clear; the focus and intended belief and actions are unmistakable. As a result, even people with low political or historical knowledge can seize upon buzzwords, jump on the bandwagon and feel that they are taking part in history, particularly if a pollster calls. Is this "the new American way"? Whether this produces a stable, well-functioning democracy is perhaps a question for several additional studies.
One study of post-Sept. 11 reactions found that Bush had been able to frame the issues and the language of public discourse in such a way that a majority of Americans have supported him on issues that they link to the Sept. 11 attacks (Huddy et al., 2002) . The team studied all major polls since Sept. 11 and found that Americans sense of threat decreased, as did support for government's monitoring their private lives and confidence in the ability of government to stop terrorist attacks; however, the American public's support never wavered for intervention in Afghanistan, President Bush's handling of the campaign against terrorism, and military action against other countries that support terrorism. Readers of the Wall Street Journal would have been right at home; never did the Journal stray from its wholehearted support of the president, even when editorialists chose to chastise his Secretary of State (it was Powell, you see, who argued against deposing Hussein in 1991) or reminding readers that Bush Sr. was too soft on Hus- This research raises serious questions about the state of the media and the prospects for democracy in the United States that have been raised in other ways by numerous journalists and scho lars (Chomsky, 2002, for example) . Whether the timidity of contemporary U.S. media is a symptom of overall societal ills that are also reflected in voting patterns, knowledge lacks and other social ills or whether the media are, as some critics would claim, the cause of the problems has long been debated. Norris developed a "virtuous circle" theory to explain her judgment that post-industrial civic disengagement, ignorance of civic affairs, and mistrust of government demand understanding and confrontation of "deep-rooted flaws in systems of representative go vernment" (2000).
While many assessments of media performance in the time of Bush have been dismal, some academics hold out hope. Work by Shah, et al. suggested that the media's revelation of conservative elites' attacks on President Clinton framed the Lewinsky story in such a way as to gain public support (Shah, et al., 2002) . Another hopeful message comes from a study by Guo and Moy; the study provided "convincing evidence for news media effects on learning," with newspaper news predicting knowledge and television use predicting interest (1998). While television failed to add to viewers' knowledge as much as newspapers, the authors stressed that the results do not suggest that television is "inherently incapable of enhancing political sophistication. Given the role newspapers were expected to play in the political life of the United States at the time it was fo unded, a role enshrined in freedom of the press and freedom of expression clauses in the First Amendment, it would seem that greater academic attention might need to be paid to the industry and to television's capability of informing and engaging citizens.
sents. An undercurrent (or more) of resentment at Western civilization runs through the chanceries and bazaars of the Arab world, as well as a fear of what democracy might mean for the power of local rulers.
Getting Serious
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Sep 13, 2001;
Abstract:
For fear of hiring rogues, the CIA decided it would only hire Boy Scouts. But the people most likely to inform on terrorists are fellow terrorists. There is always a risk they will behave badly later, and the press will play up that he or she was once paid by the U.S. The bipartisan Bremer panel, whose chairman Paul Bremer elaborates nearby, said this [John Deutsch] rule sent "an unmistakable message to CIA officers in the field that recruiting clandestine sources of terrorist information is encouraged in theory but discouraged in practice." And it led to the sharpest decline in CIA "morale" since the 1970s. For effective anti-terrorism, the CIA needs to be able to dangle enough cash or other incentives to enough bad guys that one of them will talk before Americans die.
The Next Attack
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Sep 14, 2001
Abstract:
The reply is often made that a [Saddam Hussein], say, would never launch a missile attack because the U.S. would respond with massive force. But Saddam wants missiles not merely to strike at the U.S. but also to reduce our ability to act militarily. A President without defenses against missiles would have to think twice before he deployed U.S. forces to the Gulf or to defend some ally. And it is precisely the U.S. ability to project force abroad that is likely to deter the Irans, Iraqs, North Koreas and other states that sponsor and protect Osama bin Laden and other terrorists. In short, missile defense is as much a defense against hijacked airliners as it is against missiles.
A New Presidency
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Sep 19, 2001;
Abstract:
George W. Bush now finds himself in far better political circumstances, with nearly universal public support before he undertakes any military action. The public will not soon want to hear from critics who appear to be angling for partisan gain. This means that for the next few months Mr. Bush will have enormous political capital to do whatever he says must be done to help the war effort and buttress national strength. But the lesson of history is that Presidents must spend political capital or they will lose it. And when they spend it and win, they accumulate even more capital.
War Aims
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Sep 20, 2001;
Abstract:
Mr.
[Bush] has been preparing the country for a large and long military campaign, and by all accounts that's what it is going to take to protect American citizens from attack. In Afghanistan, that almost certainly means the insertion of U.S. ground troops to enter, track down and take bin Laden. This could require airlifting in the 82nd Airborne, presumably by helicopter from Pakistan or from U.S. carriers.
Rallying the Country
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Sep 21, 2001 the Shiites in the South. He finished the job a few years later when he killed most of the former Iraqi military officers whom the CIA had been organizing to take him down. Saddam has proved more adept at infiltrating the CIA's operations than the CIA has at infiltrating his.
Afghan Lessons
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Dec 19, 2001 Abstract: This doesn't mean that the U.S. will never have to deploy large ground forces again. But it does allow for the application of military power with far fewer casualties, which gives a U.S. President many more policy options. In Afghanistan, it allowed the U.S. to topple the Taliban in only two months in a landlocked country half a world away, and with only a hand ful of U.S. casualties so far. It's a remarkable achievement.
The Saddam We Know
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Dec 21, 2001;
Abstract:
As the Iraq-Iran war rolls on through the 1980s, perhaps 1.5 million people die on both sides. [Saddam Hussein] himself uses chemical weapons without provocation. The countries agree to a cease fire in 1988. But that same year Saddam uses nerve gas to attack Kurds in the northern Iraqi town of Halabja. Nearly 5,000 men, women and children are killed.
Osama on the Run
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Dec 28, 2001;
Abstract:
Conflicting reports yesterday put Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan at the same time, but one place where he was for sure was on al-Jazeera television, boasting again about what a good terrorist he is. The hunt will no doubt continue, but it's worth considering the latest offering from the all-Osamaall-the-time Qatari station and what it says about where to put the emphasis in the war on terror.
State and Saddam
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Jan 10, 2002
Abstract:
Back in 1998 bipartisan majorities in Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, making it U.S. policy to remove Saddam Hussein from power and appropriating $97 million for opposition groups like the Iraqi National Congress (INC). But the State Department has often behaved since as if the real U.S. enemy is the Iraqi opposition and not the dictator. 
A War Leader

Abstract:
On the one hand, Mr.
[Bush] says Ariel Sharon is a "man of peace," and that the U.S. will never abandon Israel. He winked for two weeks as the Israeli Prime Minister continued his siege of the West Bank after the President had first said "enough is enough"; he's also implied that Mr. Sharon will be able to repeat his anti-terror sweep if there are more suicide bombers. And he's even tolerated (encouraged?) a Pentagon leak suggesting that planning is proceeding apace for an invasion of Iraq, either later this year or next.
Democracy for Palestine
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; May 22, 2002;
Abstract:
We refer to the unprecedented outpouring of public discontent in Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority over the past week. Just a fortnight ago the conventional wisdom was that Israel's lengthy West Bank incursion had only strengthened Mr. Arafat by forcing Palestinians to rally behind their leader; President Bush would be mired in an ever-worsening Israeli-Palestinian crisis as he tried to build a coalition against Iraq. 
George and Vlad
Abstract:
As in the first year of any war, some of the progress is ambiguous or incomplete. Pakistan's military government no longer winks at al Qaeda, but its lack of democratic consent makes it a vulnerable ally. Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi support for terrorism has been exposed as a devil's bargain, but that kingdom has also not yet decided whose side it is on.
Action Will Be Unavoidable'
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Sep 13, 2002;
Abstract:
[Bush] was asking the U.N. to save its own dignity. He pointed to the U.N.'s founding, "after ge nerations of deceitful dictators, broken treaties and squandered lives." He explained at length how [Saddam Hussein] has flouted a litany of Security Council resolutions (16 in all), often citing the conclusions of the U.N.'s own institutions as evidence. And he declared that the U.N. now faces a "difficult and defining moment": "Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?" 
Gore Debates Blair
Abstract:
Then the U.S. can begin to construct a new policy of pressure and containment aimed at changing the rogue regime. Now, let's be clear we aren't suggesting the U.S. go to war; the showdown with Iraq is a higher priority and will itself be instructive to the North. Any scary rhetoric about war, which we expect to hear a lot of, will come from the left and is designed to force the U.S. back toward the Clinton appeasement.
Saddam Ceausescu?
Wall Geographic Names: Iran
Abstract:
If Iran's head is dominated by the theocrats, its heart seems to favor freedom. The government's own pollsters asked Iranians recently whether they wanted dialogue with the U.S., and more than 70% said yes. In a real democracy that would set off a debate and possibly a change of policy. In Iran, it got the pollsters arrested. Their trial on a long list of charges, including conducting "flawed" opinion polls, began last week.
Scud Seizure
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Dec 12, 2002;
Abstract:
He means that since 9/11 Yemen has been cooperating with the U.S. in the war on terror. U.S. Special Forces are in Yemen training soldiers, and last month Yemen gave its approval to a U.S. airstrike in which an unmanned Predator aircraft fired Hellfire missiles that killed six al Qaeda operatives, including one big fish.
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer was hardly clarifying when he said yesterday that the U.S. "had no choice but to obey international law." Does that mean that if the Scuds were headed for Iraq or Libya we would also return them? If the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption means anything, the U.S. should have the right to confiscate weapons sold by, and headed for, sponsors of terror. John Kerry will not be pleased to learn that nearly 70% also said they supported multilateral action against Iraq if the inspections failed. Support drops to 18% if the U.S. goes in without United Nations backing, though that figure largely mirrors the broader U.S. public.
Saddam's Burden of Proof
To Pyongyang Via Baghdad
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Jan 13, 2003
Abstract:
Warren Christopher, the Clinton Secretary of State who presided over the 1994 Agreed Framework now shown to be a failure, suggests the U.S. should change its "priorities" from Baghdad to Pyongyang. What does he want, a "pre-emptive" strike? Maybe cruise missiles fired from a thousand miles away at a few North Korean tents? That sure worked well against Osama bin Laden (and there weren't 37,000 U.S. troops just across the border from Afghanistan as a potential target of retaliation).
Iraq for Iraqis
Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Jan 22, 2003
Abstract:
What concerns us now are reports of heavy-handedness in planning for the transition to a post- [Saddam] Iraq. Opposition leaders complained that Washington tried to call all the shots at their big December meeting in London. Some even threatened a boycott. But the meeting turned out to be a success in any event. The exiles planned a conference for this month in Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq and the U.S. said it would send a delegation. 
If Saddam Survives
Abstract:
The notion that France and Germany speak for all of Europe is especially absurd, akin to assuming that New York City and Washington, D.C., speak for all of America. Down in the polls, German leader Gerhard Schroeder barely speaks for a majority in his own country. 
Powell's Smoking Gun
Abstract:
The Mexican and Chilean fandango is especially insulting given the preferential treatment their exports receive to the U.S. market. Maybe we should transfer to Bulgaria --which is supporting us sans bribery --the trade benefits that these two nations apparently take for granted. These columns have long tried sympathetically to explain Mexican realities to our readers, but President Vicente Fox's U.N. war straddle will cost his country years of U.S. public goodwill.
